This paper axiomatizes expected multi-utility representations of incomplete preferences under risk and under uncertainty. The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model with incomplete preferences is revisited using a "constructive" approach, as opposed to earlier treatments that use convex analysis. . . . .
Introduction
The presumption that a decision maker is always able to express clear preference among alternatives has long been recognized as highly unrealistic, especially in situations requiring choice among alternatives involving distinct attributes that are not readily comparable. 1 Consequently, the use of the completeness axiom to model rational decision making is problematic, to say the least. Aumann (1962) was the …rst to broach this issue in the context of expected utility theory under risk. Taking, as primitive, an incomplete transitive and re ‡exive binary relation on the set of risky prospects that satis…es the independence axiom and a weak form of continuity, Aumann showed that one risky prospect is (weakly) preferred over another only if its expected utility is greater for a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Shapley and Baucells (1998) provided an axiomatic characterization of expected multi-utility representation of incomplete, transitive, and re ‡exive preference relation on a closed and convex subset of …nite dimensional linear space satisfying independence and mixture continuity. 2 Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004) axiomatized expected multi-utility representation of incomplete preference relations over probability distributions, whose support is a compact metric space. They also showed that the utility functions that …gure in the representation are unique in the sense that any other expected multi-utility representation of the same preference relation must span a cone whose closure is the same as that of the original representation with possible shifts resulting from adding constant functions.
In this note we revisit the von Neumann-Morgenstern model to study necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of expected multi-utility representation and to study its uniqueness properties.
3 Like Shapley and Baucells (1998), we assume that the choice set is a closed and convex subset of …nite dimensional linear space. In addition, we assume that the choice set have a greatest element (that is, an element that is strictly preferred to every other element of the set) and a smallest element (that is, an element that every other element of the set is strictly preferred to it). Unlike Aumann (1962) and Shapley and Baucells (1998) , our primitive preference relation is a strict partial order (that is, a transitive and irre ‡exive binary relation). To model the weak preference relation we invoke the de…nition of the closure of the strict preference relation introduced in Galaabaatar and Karni (2011) . The di¤erence between the de…nitions of the weak preferences, to be discussed in greater details below, highlights the distinction between the continuity assumption invoked by Shapley and Baucells (1998) and in our model. In particular, Shapley and Baucells assume mixture continuity. Consequently, incompleteness in their model imply that the Archimedean axiom cannot hold. 4 By contrast, the two notions of continuity, namely, mixture and Archimedean continuity, are consistent with incomplete preferences in our model. 5 Finally, Shapley and Baucells (1998) did not address the issue of uniqueness of the representation. In this paper we include the uniqueness result.
Unlike previous studies that use convex analysis as the main analytical tool, we take a "constructive" approach, which makes the representation more transparent and easier to understand. We also show that the expected multi-utility representation of the strict partial order extends to the weak partial order. Without loss of generality let L be chosen so that C and L have the same cardinal dimension. 6 A preference relation is a binary relation on C denoted by . The set C is said to be -bounded if there exist p M and p m in C such that p The di¤erence between the preference structure above and that of expected utility theory is that the induced relation : (p q) is re ‡exive but not necessarily transitive (hence it is not necessarily a preorder). Moreover, it is not necessarily complete. Thus, : (p q) and : (q p) does not imply that p and q are indi¤erent (i.e., equivalent), rather they may be noncomparable. If p and q are noncomparable we write p ./ q:
De…nitions 1: For all p; q 2 C, (a) p < GK q if r p implies r q; for all r 2 C; (b) p q if p < GK q and q < GK p; and (c) p D q if p < GK q and :(p q):
If satis…es (A.1)-(A.3) then the derived binary relation < GK on C is a weak order (that is, transitive and re ‡exive) satisfying the Archimedean and independence axioms that is not necessarily complete. 7 The indi¤erence relation, GK , that is, the symmetric part of < GK ; is an equivalence relation.
Taking the strict preference relation, ; as primitive, it is customary to de…ne a weak preference relations as the negation of . Formally, given a binary relation on C; de…ne a binary relation < on C by: p < q if : (q p) :
8 If the strict preference relation, ; is transitive and irre ‡exive, then the weak preference relation, <; is complete. Karni (2011) shows that that weak preference relations < GK and < agree if and only if is negatively transitive and < GK is complete.
The standard practice in decision theory is to take the weak preference relation as primitive and de…ne the strict preference relation as it asymmetric part. Invoking the standard practice, Dubra (2010) , showed that if C is the set of lotteries on a …nite set of prizes and the weak preference relation is nontrivial (that is, 6 = ?) and satis…es (A.3), then any two of the following 7 The proof of the claim about the independence is part of the proof of Theorem 1, below. Note that is not the asymmetric part of < :
8 For example, and Kreps (1988) .
axioms implied the third, completeness, Archimedean, and mixture continuity. 9 Thus, a nontrivial, partial, preorder satisfying independence must fail to satisfy one of the continuity axioms. Karni (2011) showed that, if the weak preference relation is as in De…nitions 1, then a nontrivial preference relation may satisfy independence, Archimedean, mixture continuity and yet be incomplete. Hence, the approach taken here seems more natural for modeling incomplete preferences as an extension of choice theory with complete preferences.
For every p 2 C; let B (p) := fq 2 C j q pg and W (p) := fq 2 C j p qg denote the upper and lower contour sets of p; respectively. The relation is convex if the upper contour set is convex. Lemma 1: Let be a binary relation on C. If satis…es (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) then it is convex. Moreover, the lower contour set is also convex.
The proof is by two applications of (A.3). 10 
The fundamental representation theorem
We present a general result giving rise to the …nite-dimensional expected multi-utility representations under risk, and additively separable multi-utility representation under uncertainty, as immediate implications. To state this result, we use the following notations: Let B be a set of sets of real-valued, a¢ ne, functions on L such that U 2 B implies that
The Main Representation Theorem: Let C be a nonempty, convex, subset of a …nite dimensional linear space, L: Let be a binary relation on C; then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C is -bounded and satis…es (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) (ii) There exists nonempty closed convex set,
; for all p 2 C fp M ; p m g and U 2 U, and, for all p; q 2 C;
9 A weak preference relation satis…es mixture continuity if, for all p; q; r 2 (X) the sets f 2 [0; 1] j p + (1 ) q < rg and f 2 (1995) show that a strict partial order, de…ned by strict …rst-order stochastic dominance, has expected multi-utility representation, satis…es the independence axiom and violates the Archimedean axiom. 11 To bypass this problem, Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) and subsequent writers invoked alternative continuity axioms that, unlike the Archimedean axiom, require the imposition of a topological structures. 12 We maintained the Archimedean axiom as our continuity postulate at the cost of restricting the upper contour sets associated with the strict preference relation, Uniqueness Theorem: If V is another set in B that represents < GK and in the sense of (1) and (2), respectively, then hVi = hUi:
Expected multi-utility representation for simple probability measures
Let X = fx 1 ; :::; x n g be a …nite set of prizes and denote by (X) the set of all probability measures on X: For each`;`0 2 (X) and
; for all x 2 X: Then (X) is a convex subset of the linear space R X : Let M ,`m 2 (X) satisfy`M ` `m; for all`2 (X) : Application of Theorem 1 to C = (X) yields an expected multi-utility representation. (ii) There exists nonempty, closed and convex set, U 2 B; of real-valued functions on X such that X
for all`2 (X) f`M ;`mg; and u 2 U and, for all p; q 2 (X) ;
and
Moreover, if V is another set of real-valued, a¢ ne, functions on (X) that represent < GK and in the sense of (3) and (4), respectively, then hVi = hUi.
Proof: Let C = (X) and U = fu 2 R X j u p = U (p), U 2 Ug; then the conclusions of the corollary are implied by Theorem 1.
Additively separable multi-utility representation
Consider the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model. Let S be a …nite set of states. Subsets of S are events. Let H := fh : S ! (X)g be the set whose elements are acts. For all h; h 0 2 H and
Under this de…nition H = (X) S is a convex subset of the linear space
for all h 2 H: Applying Theorem 1 to H; we obtain the following: 14 13 For every s 2 S; the convex mixture h (s)+(1 ) h 0 (s) is de…ned as in the preceding subsection.
14 A similar result appears in Nau (2006) for …nite X. Ok, et. al. (2008) show that the same holds when X is a compact metric space. As mentioned, these authors use a continuity assumption stronger than (A.2).
Corollary 2 (Additive multi-utility representation) Let be a binary relation on H, then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded and satis…es (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3).
(ii) There exists nonempty, convex and closed, set W 2 B of real-valued functions, w, on (X) S; a¢ ne in its …rst argument such that
for all h 2 H fh M ; h m g; and w 2 W and, for all h; h 0 2 H;
Moreover, if W 0 is another set of real-valued, a¢ ne, functions on H that represent < GK and in the sense of (5) and (6), respectively, then
The proof is by the application of a standard argument (see Kreps [1988] ) to U in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 3: Let W s := fw ( ; s) j w 2 Wg: By Corollary 1, w (h (s) ; s) = P x2Supp(h(s)) u (x; s) h (x; s) ; where u ( ; s) is a real-valued function on X; for all s 2 S:
The representations in Corollary 2 are not the most parsimonious as the set W includes functions that are redundant (that is, their removal does not a¤ect the representation).
3 Proofs of the Main Theorem 3.1 Proof of the main representation theorem (i) ) (ii) : If is empty then, by de…nition, p < GK q and q < GK p; for all p; q 2 C: Let U be the set of all constant real-valued functions on C:
Henceforth, assume that is not empty.
A preference relation is said to satisfy mixture monotonicity if p q and 0
Claim 1: satis…es mixture monotonicity.
The proof, by standard argument, is an implication of (A.3).
15
Claim 2. < GK satis…es independence (that is, for all p; q; r 2 C and 2 (0; 1); p < GK q implies p + (1 ) r < GK q + (1 ) r).
Proof of claim 2:
By mixture monotonicity and (A.3),
De…ne t := (1 )p M + p. Then t p. Also, by the above equation, s t + (1 ) r. p < GK q and t p together implies t q. Then independence axiom, (A.3), implies s t + (1 ) r q + (1 ) r. Therefore, s q + (1 ) r. | Claim 3. Let p M and p m be the greatest and smallest elements of C, respectively. Then, for each q 2 C; there exist (q) ; (q) 2 (0; 1) such that
Proof of claim 3: Let S 
Hence, by De…nition 1, 
By the same argument as above, i ( ) is a convex function on J whose restriction to L (p; q (i; )) is a¢ ne.
Fix p 2 J and let Q = fq 2 J j i (q) = i (p)g: The every p 2 C may be expressed as p = &p M + (1 &) q for some q 2 Q and 1 &: 
n de…ne a function U : C ! R by U (q) = u q: Let U := fU j u 2 Gg; then, by de…nition, U 2 U implies that U is a¢ ne.
By de…nition of 17 Denote by G i the epigraph of i ( ), then G i and C are convex sets, hence, so is G \ C: For every p 2 C such that e n p e i ; for all i = 1; :::; n 1, and let H u i ;p ; i (p) be a supporting hyperplane of G i at p: That such a hyperplane exists follows from the fact that the algebraic interior, G o i ; of G i is nonempty (e.g., ( Note that every vector in 2 B has the form (# ) ; for some #; 2 C such that # : Suppose that the exist V 2 hVi = hUi : Since hUi is a convex cone, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists in L, 6 = 0; such that U > 0 V for all U 2 hUi : But the constant vectors are in hUi :
Proofs of the uniqueness theorem
i for all 2 R. Thus, n P i=1 i = 0: But, by Theorem 1, U > 0 for all U 2 hUi implies that 2 B; hence = (# ), for some #; 2 C such that # 6 = 0 6 = : Substituting for in the above inequalities we get: U # > U ; for all U 2 U and V V #: A contradiction. The case U 2 hUi = hVi is ruled out by the same argument. Hence, hVi = hUi :
